How Trump Is Handing Eurasia to China and Russia

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Has the U.S. handed Eurasia to Russia and China? The summit meeting between President Donald Trump and Chinese Leader Xi Jinping highlights the question

The British academic Halford Mackinder (1861–1947) is generally considered the founder of geopolitics, the study of how geography affects politics, diplomacy, and military strategy. His most famous work was a 1904 essay, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” on which most of his later works were elaborations. After languishing for decades in relative obscurity, it now resonates more and more with world events.

He argued that the vast interior of Eurasia, stretching roughly from the black-earth belt of Ukraine to the Yangtze in China, was the geographical heartland of what he called the “world island” of Eurasia and Africa. This area was rich in grain, timber, and minerals, but until Mackinder’s time, sparse transportation and limited industrial development constrained its potential. In his view, whichever power could harness these resources would become the ruler of the “world island” and, effectively, the world, as it would be invulnerable to attack from offshore maritime powers.

Given the transportation improvements of his time (such as the Trans-Siberian Railway), Mackinder projected that railways could end the centuries-long dominance of sea power that had existed since the Age of Discovery. Imperial Russia was the obvious contender for hegemon status, since it occupied virtually all the heartland, but its comparative backwardness impaired its potential for the medium term.

Given his British imperial sympathies, Mackinder’s nightmare scenario was an alliance between Russia and Germany. The latter’s technology and organizational skill combined with Russia’s limitless resources and vast continental space would make the bloc invulnerable to blockade or invasion.

Ten years after he published his essay, Russia and Germany were not allies; they were at war. But for a few months in 1918, it seemed as if the nightmare scenario might be achieved. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 1918, a near-total Bolshevik capitulation, ceded vast agricultural and mineral lands to Germany while the rump of Soviet Russia observed a benevolent neutrality toward the Central Powers. Germany could shift its eastern armies to the Western Front, hoping the Ukrainian harvest would nullify the Allied sea blockade.

It was too late: The German offensive stalled, American troops poured into France at a monthly rate of 300,000 by summer, and hunger undermined both the German home front and the army. After the Central Powers’ capitulation, the Allies resolved to create buffer states between Germany and Soviet Russia, a move in line with Mackinder’s own advocacy in his 1919 book, Democratic Ideals and Reality.

The Axis and the Heartland

Given the Western democracies’ failure to uphold collective security, another nightmare scenario loomed by 1939. It was Russia (now the Soviet Union) and Germany again, two hyper-aggressive totalitarian powers ruled by Josef Stalin and Adolf Hitler. The Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 1939 horrified Mackinder, as it vindicated his prediction of the Eurasian heartland’s consolidation by a militant, expansionist power bloc.

The rise of this brutal coalition captured the intellectual spirit of the age, as shown by Anne Morrow Lindbergh’s best-selling (and overtly pro-fascist) The Wave of the Future and James Burnham’s The Managerial Revolution. The latter partially inspired George Orwell’s 1984, as did portions of Mackinder’s 1943 Foreign Affairs article describing Britain as a “moated aerodrome” against any Eurasian threat. This later became 1984’s Airstrip One, and Orwell’s dystopian novel also employed the terms Eurasia, Oceania, and Eastasia, roughly corresponding to Mackinder’s geography.

While it lasted, the Nazi-Soviet pact was enormously beneficial to Hitler, freeing his army for a lightning conquest of the western European democracies while providing for Soviet deliveries of oil, grain, and strategic metals to Germany’s war machine. That circumstance, however, motivated the predatory Hitler to resolve not to depend on Soviet goodwill, but to seize those resources by force and create his own Eurasian empire.

 When the German invasion of the USSR commenced in June 1941, the U.S. War Department estimated that the Soviets would hold out for only one to three months. The Germans themselves thought it would take only until the end of summer and began extensive planning to become the continental hegemon. This included discussions with Japan about dividing Eurasia between them. Fortunately for the world, this arrangement never came to fruition; the U.S. industrial base—the world’s largest, in a secure, uninvadable location—ensured the Axis could not prevail.

The Cold War and beyond

The outcome of World War II, as well as the Cold War, might seem to refute Mackinder’s thesis. The Soviet Union’s sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and its formal alliance with China may have caused hysteria among anticommunists—James Burnham, a former Trotskyite who, after the war, aligned with the American right wing, worked himself into a frenzy of doomsaying with such books as Suicide of the West and The Struggle for the World—but economic stagnation in the post-World War II era meant that the all-powerful Sino-Soviet Bloc existed mostly in name.

Despite the panic over Sputnik and the CIA’s retrospectively laughable forecast that the USSR’s GDP would surpass that of the United States, Moscow’s economic and technological prowess was a Potemkin village. I visited the Soviet Union in 1979, and its dilapidated infrastructure, dearth of basic consumer goods, and sickly look of the population (life expectancy was dropping) convinced me of the truth of then German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s quip that the USSR was “Upper Volta with missiles.”

As for the other half of the vaunted bloc, China’s living standard was lower than that of many developing countries in Africa. Mao’s catastrophic experiments like the Great Leap Forward turned poverty into famine, and the ensuing Great Cultural Revolution only added to the immiseration. The 1961 Sino-Soviet split, which led to serious border clashes, somehow escaped the notice of much of the American foreign policy establishment, which remained enamored of the domino theory. Burnham and the National Review crowd chose to see the split as a dastardly Communist hoax.

U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War ensured that the Communist powers’ ability to project political and military power was limited. Washington patiently built and nurtured alliances around what Mackinder called the Eurasian rimland: As long as Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand were with the United States, the bulk of the world’s economic power remained out of the Sino-Soviet grasp.

The Warsaw Pact’s collapse in 1989–90 seemed to drive the final nail into the coffin of Mackinder’s Heartland hypothesis. Post-Soviet Russia was on life support, and China was still recovering from Mao’s terror; the prospect of a Eurasian hegemon seemed risible. The following decade was an era of self-congratulatory declarations that America was the sole superpower, with some going so far as to christen it a hyperpower. This attitude led to rhetoric like that of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s: “We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall, and we see further than other countries into the future . . .”

Halford Mackinder. Credit: Wikimedia Commons

How to destroy a hyperpower

Reputedly, Charles de Gaulle remarked that the graveyards are full of indispensable men; so, it seems, are nations. The George W. Bush administration took Albright’s boilerplate and transformed it into a doctrine—or maybe crusade—after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. A prudent response might have been a counterterrorism policy of strengthened diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement ties with affected nations, along with selective special forces operations. Instead, Bush and his lieutenants turned it into a full-scale military conflict, the prolonged occupation of two large Middle Eastern nations, and the belittling of longtime allies (some of whom suffered significant terrorist blowback), while squandering nearly $10 trillion, including debt interest costs.

Even a hyperpower cannot hemorrhage money, alienate friends, and run its military ragged as a global constabulary without suffering damage. The 2010s became the decade of China’s rise and Russia’s recovery, the latter partially driven by the spike in oil prices engendered by the Bush administration’s Middle East misadventures. The international waters of the South China Sea gradually became a de facto Chinese lake, while Vladimir Putin’s Russia took its first bite out of Ukraine’s territory in 2014.

The U.S. response to these developments was underwhelming; more than a decade of nonstop war had blunted the appetite for foreign-policy activism. The about-face was most abrupt on the right. Republican politicians and their supporters had cast a response to 9/11 as a civilizational crusade; now they adopted the thought-terminating cliché “America First” and traded paranoia over foreign bogeymen for political opponents in their framing of existential threats.

Donald Trump’s presidency was the logical outcome of this transformation. After receiving electoral assistance from Putin in 2016, Trump aligned his foreign policy with the Kremlin’s desires. The Republican Party, strongly Russophobic as well as anticommunist since Joseph McCarthy’s Wheeling, West Virginia, speech in 1950, abruptly shifted, ironically mimicking the behavior of the American communists who instantly ditched their antifascist pose upon hearing of Stalin’s nonaggression pact with Hitler.

While the Bush administration’s rhetoric irritated traditional allies, Trump’s outright hostility, including punitive tariffs, invasion threats, and open support of their right-wing and separatist parties, has caused significant—perhaps permanent—alienation, and seventy-five years of alliance-building with the Atlantic and Pacific rimlands have been shattered.

It has come at the worst possible time. The Kremlin has felt emboldened to wage “hybrid warfare” on Western Europe, whose military alliance, NATO, now lacks its strongest member as a backstop. Instead, Putin seems to dictate Washington’s foreign policy even as Trump attempts to transform America into a corrupt gangster regime in imitation of Russia’s.

The rise of Chinese Superpower

On Eurasia’s eastern littoral, China’s industrial growth has been history’s most spectacular. Its industrial base is now larger than America, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom’s combined. This translates into military power: China’s aggregate shipbuilding capacity is estimated to be more than 230 times greater than that of the United States, according to assessments from the Office of Naval Intelligence. It has substantially more combatant ships than the U.S. Navy, although the latter still has the qualitative advantage in heavy surface warships and submarines.

This is particularly relevant to the Heartland thesis. In both world wars and the Cold War, the Eurasian powers’ interior lines of communication (and, in the Cold War, superior military manpower potential) were offset by the democracies’ lead in industry and technology, as well as their naval supremacy, which assured a secure logistical tie to America’s overseas allies. But in any Pacific maritime contest, links to the high-tech centers of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan will be endangered. And with the U.S. Navy fully engaged in the Pacific, America’s ability to support NATO in a crisis becomes highly questionable—even assuming the government of the day in Washington intended to do so.

Mackinder’s dream (or nightmare) of a Eurasia knit together by rail links is not yet complete, but China’s explosive economic growth has fueled remarkable progress. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides not only rail links to European commerce hubs like Duisburg, Hamburg, Rotterdam, and Paris, but also roads, oil and gas pipelines, and ports. By the end of 2025, investment in the project reached a gargantuan $1.4 trillion.

The project makes China’s foreign trade far less vulnerable to military interdiction, since interior Asian trade routes are not easily reachable by U.S. military power. It also reduces the importance of chokepoints for seaborne trade, like the Strait of Malacca, through which much of China’s trade has traditionally passed, while partially undermining the U.S. island chain’s ability to dominate the eastern Pacific. The BRI can also make participating countries’ economies more dependent on Chinese trade, precisely as Trump and his operatives pull up the drawbridge on international commerce. One has to ask whether America’s purchase of the F-35 fighter, at a total life-cycle cost of almost $2 trillion, is a wiser long-term strategic investment than BRI.

Putin’s Russia and Eurasianism

The implications of Mackinder’s thesis are playing out in Beijing. Russia has long had a Eurasianist faction in its strategic community, and under Putin’s regime, they have had a strong impact. Probably the greatest influence on the Kremlin leader (mainly through his writings; a major personal connection has been disputed) has been Aleksander Dugin. A far-right figure in Russia since the early 1990s, Dugin blends pan-Slav nationalism, Russian Orthodox mysticism, and devotion to several early-20th-century European fascist theorists.

Aleksander Dugin. Credit: Wikimedia Commons

His 1997 work, The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia, is a polemic written with General Nikolai Klokotov of the Russian General Staff. The book advocates rebuilding Russian global power through a Eurasian empire by pitting land-based powers (tellurocracy, organized by Moscow) against sea-based Atlantic powers (thalassocracy, centered on the United States and NATO). The Russian General Staff Academy has used it as a textbook, and it has influenced Russian military, security, and foreign policy circles.

It is striking how closely Dugin recapitulated much of Mackinder’s Heartland thesis, albeit from the opposite perspective. The work also seemed to predict future events. Dugin suggested psychological operations and disinformation to foment racial, religious, and sectional divisions inside the United States while supporting isolationist political factions. Ukraine, he wrote, should be annexed to Russia, arguing, as Putin did in 2022, that Ukraine has no geopolitical meaning except as a part of the “Russian world.” Dugin also advocated psychological operations in the U.K. to create tensions with Western Europe and encourage Britain’s exit from the European Union.

One predictive misfire was Dugin’s belief that China could be partitioned, distracted towards Southeast Asia, or maintained as a junior Eurasian partner to a dominant Russia. China’s economy is almost eight times larger than Russia’s, and its high-tech sector is miles ahead. Yes, a quasi-hegemonic Eurasian coalition now exists, per Putin and Xi Jinping’s 2022 announcement of an “unlimited partnership,” but China ultimately calls the shots. That said, it is a complementary relationship: China’s massive manufacturing and tech base and huge population fit well with Russia’s fossil-fuel wealth and other resources, along with a geography that stretches from Europe to the Pacific. It is an authoritarian bloc that faces a fractured Western alliance whose strongest member at times actively supports these authoritarian powers.

Trump’s Strange Appeasement of China

Trump’s subservience to Putin’s interests is too widely known to require recapitulation. But his attitude toward China, nominally one of MAGA’s demons, is remarkable and has garnered little notice until now. His solicitude towards Xi, most evident in the latter’s visit to the United States in September (behavior Trump extends to no democratic leader), is clearly the result of his general admiration for dictators, but likely also for the alacrity with which the Xi regime has extended trademark protection to the Trump family’s kleptocratic “business activities.”

Trump’s heavy tariffs on close allies, such as Canada, amount to punitive sanctions, but they generally don’t apply to China, which has used its market dominance in certain goods like rare earths to gain exemptions. Average U.S. tariffs on Chinese products are roughly in line with the world average. High-end computer chips that were embargoed to China under Joe Biden are now being exported to that country under Trump. The breaking Nvidia spy scandal has uncovered almost unbelievable laxity—or corruption—in America’s export control policy toward China.

Chinese human rights abuses, previously talked up by the American right, no longer receive attention. Hong Kong’s autonomy and its residents’ freedom were once a major foreign policy concern. Now ICE is rounding up for deportation those Hong Kong Chinese who came to America as refugees. When was the last time we heard about the treatment of the Uighurs or the Tibetans? The religious freedom of Christian “house churches” in China was once an issue for American religious conservatives. The Trump regime, always touting its devotion to religious freedom (which, in its interpretation, means the freedom of Christians solely), seems strangely indifferent to their plight.

Can the Damage be Repaired?

We might be tempted to believe that Republicans’ catastrophic 2026 midterm elections dealt a check to Trump’s power to damage our allies and comfort our adversaries. But European views are more guarded: The president still has inordinate latitude in foreign policy (partly a legacy of a decades-long abdication of congressional powers that will be very difficult to claw back), and a politically wounded Trump could be even more dangerous.

The latest events seem to support their fears. Only two days after the elections, Trump met with Kirill Dmitriev, one of Putin’s top envoys, at the White House to discuss yet another purported peace deal. According to the president, “it might involve all of Europe,” leaving open the question of whether all of Europe would have much say in what might be decided.

The same week, the U.K. House of Commons issued a report on Russian hybrid warfare, outlining its increasing frequency and boldness. This acceleration raises the possibility of a two-pronged Kremlin attack, pressuring Europe through unconventional warfare and diplomatic demands channeled through Washington.

The new Congress will have a daunting enough task repairing the domestic wreckage of Trump’s second term while the author of that damage remains at the Resolute Desk. But an equally grave task confronts it abroad. Can severed and strained alliances be repaired and at least something of the post-World War II order resurrected?

Such a project would take years, possibly decades. The single most important requirement, beyond any military or economic program, would be a stable American political system whose actors possess both vision and patience. And those conditions must ultimately rest on the maturity and awareness of the American voter, qualities not always in evidence.

It happened once, in the late 1940s, when a public consensus arose that the United States had to deal with the ruination of the world war, build alliances, and create an open world economic order. If America fails this time, it is probable that China, ceaselessly searching to create new markets and economically dependent satellites, allied with a Russia that is economically weak but heavily armed and more aggressive than its Cold War predecessor, will drive a stake through Pax Americana and inaugurate an era of Eurasian hegemony that Halford Mackinder warned against.


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